Abstract: Rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of words or pictured scenes provides evidence for a large-capacity conceptual short-term memory (CSTM) that momentarily provides rich associated material from long-term memory, permitting rapid chunking (Potter 1993; 2009; 2012). In perception of scenes as well as language comprehension, we make use of knowledge that briefly exceeds the supposed limits of working memory.
Abstract: Rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of words or pictured scenes provides evidence for a large-capacity conceptual short-term memory (CSTM) that momentarily provides rich associated material from long-term memory, permitting rapid chunking (Potter 1993; 2009; 2012) . In perception of scenes as well as language comprehension, we make use of knowledge that briefly exceeds the supposed limits of working memory.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) focus on cognitive limitations in language understanding and production that force immediate decisions at multiple levels. Our experiments using rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of written words and of pictured scenes show that a large-capacity but short-lasting conceptual short-term memory (CSTM), consisting of associations from long-term memory, is retrieved in response to currently active stimuli and thoughts (Potter 1993; 2012) . We "understand" when some structural connections are found between the current stimuli and CSTM. In visual perception of scenes and objects, as well as in language comprehension, we make quick use of knowledge that briefly exceeds the supposed limits of short-term memory. Consistent with C&C's core ideas, rich but unselective associations arise quickly but last only long enough for selective pattern recognition -chunking, in C&C's terms. Irrelevant associations never become conscious (or are immediately forgotten).
Three interrelated characteristics of CSTM support key ideas in C&C's target article. Demos of some of these effects can be seen on Scholarpedia (Potter 2009).
1. There is rapid access to conceptual (semantic) information about a stimulus and its associations. Conceptual information about a word or a picture is available within 100-300 ms, as shown by experiments using semantic priming (Neely 1991), including masked priming (Forster & Davis 1984) ; eye tracking when reading (Rayner 1983; 1992) or looking at pictures (Loftus 1983); measurement of event-related potentials during reading (Kutas & Hillyard 1980; Luck et al. 1996) ; and target detection in RSVP with letters and digits (Chun & Potter 1995; Sperling et al. 1971 ), with pictures (Intraub 1981 Meng & Potter 2008; Potter 1976; Potter et al. 2010 ) , or with words (Davenport & Potter 2005; Lawrence 1971b; Meng & Potter 2011; Potter et al. 2002) . Conceptually defined targets can be detected in a stream of nontargets presented at rates of 8-10 items per second or faster (Potter et al. 2014) , showing that categorical information about a written word or picture is activated and then selected extremely rapidly. The converging evidence shows that semantic or conceptual characteristics of a stimulus have an effect on performance as early as 100 ms after its onset. This time course is too rapid for slower cognitive processes, such as intentional encoding, deliberation, or serial comparison in working memory.
2. New structures can be discovered or built out of the momentarily activated conceptual information, influenced by the observer's task or goal. Evidence for this claim comes from comparing responses to RSVP sentences, scrambled sentences, and lists of unrelated words. It is possible to process the syntactic and conceptual structure in a sentence and, hence, subsequently to recall it, when reading at a rate such as 12 words per second (Forster 1970; Potter 1984; 1993; Potter et al. 1980; 1986) . In contrast, when short lists of unrelated words are presented at that rate, only two or three words can be recalled (see also Lawrence 1971a). For sentences, the meaning and plausibility of the sentence, as well as the syntactic structure, are recovered as the sentence is processed. Words that do not fit the syntax or meaning are systematically misperceived (Potter et al. 1993) . Syntactic and semantic choices are made online (Potter et al. 1998) . Memory for the sentence may be reconstructed from meaning, rather than recalled word for word (Lombardi & Potter 1992; Potter & Lombardi 1990; 1998) . Because almost all of the sentences one normally encounters (and all of the experimental sentences) include new combinations of ideas, structure-building is not simply a matter of locating a previously encountered pattern in long-term memory: It involves the creation of a new relationship among existing concepts.
As with words, so with a new pictured scene: Not only must critical objects and the setting be identified, but also the relations among them -the gist of the picture (e.g., Davenport & Potter 2004) . Associated long-term memory of visual scenes must be activated to recognize that one is looking at a picnic, or a bride and groom, or a ball game. As C&C suggest, structure-building presumably takes advantage of as much old structure as possible, using any preexisting associations and chunks of information to bind elements.
3. There is rapid forgetting of information that is not structured or that is not selected for further processing. Conceptual information is activated rapidly, but the initial activation is highly unstable and will be deactivated and forgotten within a few hundred milliseconds if it is not incorporated into a structure, consistent with C&C's proposal. As a structure is built -for example, as a sentence is being parsed and interpreted -the resulting interpretation can be held in memory and ultimately stabilized or consolidated in working or long-term memory as a unit, whereas only a small part of an unstructured sequence such as a string of unrelated words or an incoherent picture can be consolidated in the same time period.
Because similar principles seem to apply to language comprehension and to nonlinguistic visual understanding, I have proposed that understanding in both cases is abstractly conceptual rather than fundamentally language-based. For example, pictured objects and their names give equivalent and equally rapid information about meaning (Potter & Faulconer 1975; Potter et al. 1977) .
Other perceptual senses such as audition and touch also have rapid access to the same conceptual level.
If the CSTM hypothesis is correct, then the Now-or-Never bottleneck occurs after a rich set of associations from long-term memory has enabled conceptual chunking of incoming linguistic or visual information. At that point, the information can be passed through the bottleneck to a more abstract level of discourse or scene understanding. Moreover, the severe limitations of working memory seen for arbitrary lists of letters, numbers, or geometric figures are largely overcome when proactive interference from reuse of a small set of stimuli is eliminated (Endress & Potter 2014a). The desperate speed of processing noted by C&C is not due solely to the limitations of short-term memory, but more generally reflects the pressure to think, see, understand, and act as fast as possible, in order to survive in a predatory world.
Language acquisition is model-based rather than model-free Abstract: Christiansen & Chater (C&C) propose that learning language is learning to process language. However, we believe that the general-purpose prediction mechanism they propose is insufficient to account for many phenomena in language acquisition. We argue from theoretical considerations and empirical evidence that many acquisition tasks are model-based, and that different acquisition tasks require different, specialized models.
Given the Chunk-and-Pass processing necessitated by the Now-orNever bottleneck, Christiansen & Chater (C&C) propose that learning language is learning to process language. In C&C's conceptualization, the learning and prediction processes are general, (henceforth, model-free), and knowledge used in prediction arises gradually. In discussing the consequences of this scenario, C&C impose a dichotomy between these prediction-based models that are the outcome of learning to process, and learning based on more specialized constraints on how linguistic information is processed (the "child as linguist" approach, henceforth, model-based). In this commentary, we leave aside discussion of the Now-or-Never bottleneck per se and focus on C&C's claims about its theoretical consequences for language acquisition.
C&C's perspective provides an interesting framework for guiding research and developing theories. However, we argue that it does not provide significant constraints on the broader theoretical debates with which the field is engaged: in particular, debates about the nature of constraints on learning. Our argument is based on theoretical necessity and empirical evidence. Theoretically, the model-free approach is destined to be misled by surface-level information. Specifically, the general-purpose learning procedure is underspecified with respect to the level of analysis given different problems: Information for particular problems may exist at different levels, and using the wrong level may lead the learner astray. Empirically, when the model-based and model-free approaches are computationally equivalent, the model-free approach simply may not coincide with human performance. To support these claims we cite two cases: one from syntax, and another from word learning.
Many arguments for model-based learning come from phenomena that require a specific level of analysis. An oft-cited example is the constraint on structure-dependence, which specifies that grammatical operations apply to abstract phrasal structures, not linear sequences. It accounts for the fact that the yes/ no question in 1(b), following, is the correct form that is related to the declarative 1(a), but question in 1(c) is not.
1. a. The girl who is smiling is happy.
b. Is the girl who is smiling happy? c. *Is the girl who smiling is happy?
The distinction hinges superficially on which is is moved to the beginning of the sentence in the question. The grammatical principle that governs this operation is subject-auxiliary inversion; in 1(a), the subject is the complex noun phase [the girl who is smiling], so the entire structure inverts with is. The model-based argument is that young children's input lacks the positive examples of the complex embedded questions as in 1(b), but rather consists of simpler utterances such as 2(a) and 2(b); without the notion that syntactic operations operate over phrasal structures, why would a learner not conclude from 2(a) and 2(b) to simply front the first is?
(2) a. The girl is happy.
b. Is the girl happy?
Reali and Christiansen's (2005) model-free approach addresses this question. They demonstrated that a model-free learner who is sensitive to local bigram patterns could make the correct predictions about the structure of yes/no questions with complex noun phrases. This demonstration showed how attending to local sequential patterns could achieve the appropriate behavior despite not representing linguistic material at the level of syntactic hierarchies, as called for by model-based accounts. However, it turned out that the success of the model-free mechanism was an artifact of idiosyncrasies in English that had nothing to do with the syntactic structures in question (Kam et al. 2008 ). This does not rule out the possibility that a different model-free mechanism would succeed at learning the right generalizations, but adopting the view that learning language is learning to process language does not get around the fundamental challenges.
We now turn to an example from our own work in cross-situational word-learning, where model-based and model-free versions of learning mechanisms can both work in principle (Yu et al. 2007 ). Cross-situational word learning refers to naturalistic situations where learners encounter words under referential ambiguity, and learn the correct word-to-referent mappings via the accumulation of cross situational statistics (Yu & Smith 2007, among others) . The associative learning account for how cross-situational statistics are used proposes that learning is model-free, in that passive accumulation of the co-occurrence statistics between words and their possible referents suffices for learning word-referent mappings. In contrast, model-based word-learning accounts posit that, like a mini-linguist, learners have the overarching assumption that words are referential, and learners actively evaluate possible word-referent mappings (e. . We created a cross-situational learning experiment in which there was referential ambiguity within trials, but reliable cross-situational statistical information as to the word-referent mappings. In two different conditions, we held word and referent co-occurrence statistics constant but gave each group of participants different instructions. Both groups were instructed to perform a distractor task, and only one group was also told to learn word meanings. Only the latter group successfully learned the mappings, even though both groups were exposed to the same word-to-referent co-occurrence patterns. Thus, although a model-free learner could succeed in the task, human learners required the notion that words refer for word learning. We take this as evidence that model-based hypothesis testing is required for word learning empirically, even though the model-free version could have worked in principle.
In sum, although the Now-or-Never bottleneck presents interesting challenges for theories of language acquisition, the perspective C&C espouse does not solve problems that modelbased approaches do, and empirically, model-free mechanisms do not apply to certain learning situations. Thus, casting acquisition as learning to process across levels of linguistic abstraction does not avoid the theoretical controversies and debates that inhabit the field. It simply shifts the debate from the nature of the constraints on linguistic knowledge acquisition to the nature of the constraints on "learning to process." We do not believe that this shift has substantial theoretical consequences for understanding the nature of the constraints on language learning.
